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David Cohen*

THE ECONOMICS OF

W A D I A N NA TIONAL RAIL WAY

v.

NORSK PA CFIC STEAMSHIP
(THE JERVIS CROWN)+

Introduction
Economic analysis of legal doctrine assumes, indeed its relevance
largely depends upon the assumption, that judicial decisions will have
an instrumental impact on the future behaviour of firms and individuals who are not themselves parties to the litigation which resulted
in the specific doctrinal development being analysed. In other words,
economic analysis assumes that the decisions of courts - and particularly, for what should be obvious reasons, the decisions of the Supreme
Court of Canada - have a direct influence upon the manner in which
non-litigants will choose to order their affairs following that decision.
Thus, the focus of a 'law and economics' analysis - as it is often colloquially termed - is not on the legal entitlements or welfare of a particular plaintiff or the obligations or responsibilities of a particular
defendant. Rather, it is on the economic in~plicationsfor other analogous actors of allowing or denying a claim brought by a particular
individual or firm. The decision of the Supreme Court of Canada, in
Canadian National Railway Co. v. Norsk Pacijic Steamship Co. Ltd. et al.,' is
particularly amenable to such an analysis.
The Norsk litigation arose out of a collision between a barge and a
bridge on the Fraser River. Near the city of New Westminster in British
Columbia, spanning the Fraser River, stands a railway bridge commonly
referred to locally as the CNR bridge. The bridge is owned by the
federal government and managed by Public Works Canada (PWC). Although PWC had contracted with four railway companies to use the
bridge, the principal user of the bridge around the time of the accident
which led to the Norsk litigation was the Canadian National Railway
(CN).The bridge was an integral link in CN'S system -joining the Vancouver terminus to the main line - and the railway sent, on average, 32
trains with 1,530 cars a day across the bridge in 1987. This represented
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approximately 85 per cent of the daily traffic on the bridge. Under the
terms of the contract which the railway had with p w c , c N was responsible for repair and maintenance of the bridge when necessary, at the
request of the owner. There was, in other words, a sufficiently close
functional relationship between the bridge and the railway to cause
most persons to believe that the bridge belonged to C N . ~
On 28 November 1987, through a heavy fog, a barge, the Crown
Forest No. 4, was being towed west down the Fraser River by a tugboat,
the Jervis Crown, which was owned and operated by the Norsk Pacific
Steamship Company (Norsk). The barge, through the negligent operation of the tugboat, collided with the bridge, which caused extensive
damage and closed the bridge to all traffic for several weeks while
repairs were made. PWC, representing the Queen in right of Canada,
claimed damages as owner of the bridge against Norsk as well as against
the owners of the barge and the owners of another tugboat which was
assisting the Jervis Crown at the time of the accident. Only the action
for damages against Norsk was successful, and that decision - of Addy J
in the Federal Trial Court3- was not appealed.
Consolidated with the action brought by PWC, was an action brought
by three of the four railway companies which used the bridge.4 This
claim, against Norsk and the other defendants, was for pure economic
loss represented by the expenses CN necessarily incurred by the rerouting of passenger and freight trains which would normally have used the
bridge; by losses incurred by CN due to delays in shipments of freight
and, in some cases, failure to ship at all; and by additional shipping

2 T h e data on which this 'impression of ownership' conclusion was reached is not
apparent from the written reasons in the case. onet the less, this relationship was of
some consequence to the decision of the Court. As noted by La Forest J (at 339),
'C.N. heavily stressed the defendants' undoubtedly high level of subjective and
objective knowledge that C.N. as a particular company would suffer loss. My
colleague Stevenson J relies on this factor as his principal ground for finding
liability in this case. There is no question that Norsk knew and ought to have
known that C.N. would suffer loss. Indeed, the facts reveal that the tug captain
thought C.N. would suffer even more than it did, since he erroneously thought the
bridge belonged to it.'
3 26 FTR 81, 49 CCLT 1, 15 ACWS (3d) 357.
4 In a pre-trial agreement between Norsk, the Burlington Northern Railway, and the
B.C. Hydro and Power Authority Railway - Canadian Pacific, the other railway
involved, chose not to participate in the litigation - the respective claims of the two
railway companies were to be determined by the result of the action brought by CN.
O n the strength of that agreement, the two railways took no part in the litigation.
Consequently, it was only CN'S claim which was at issue d u r i n i t h e trial, appeal, and
subsequent appeal to the Supreme Court of Canada. See 26 FTR at 100.
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expenses incurred by CN - as there was also interference with the
watercourse, cargo which would have normally gone by ship or barge
had to be delayed or transported by land. AddyJ allowed CN's claim
against Norsk, dismissing the action against the others, and that
decision was upheld by the Federal Court of A ~ p e a lNorsk
.~
appealed
the Federal Court of Appeal decision to the Supreme Court of Canada.
The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal and allowed recovery for
the pure economic losses suffered by cN. The decision, consisting of
three extremely complicatedj ~ d g m e n t shas
, ~ generated interest both in
academic literature7 and in lower court judgments.' On a doctrinal
level, recovery for pure economic loss - that is, loss which is not
associated with any physical harm to the plaintiff or the plaintiffs
property - is a hotly disputed issue in Canada,' and the judgments in
Norsk have done little to provide any definitive answers.to that dispute.
In fact, the only propositions which are firmly established are negative
ones." First, the case clearly stands for the proposition that there is no

5 65 DLR (4th) 321, [I9901 3 FC 114,3 CCLT (2d) 229.
6 In the result, the Court was divided 4 to 3. McLachlin J - L'Heureux-Dubi and
CoryJ concurring - and Stevenson J wrote judgments dismissing the appeal and
allowing CN's claim for pure economic loss against Norsk. La Forest J - Sopinka
and IacobucciJ concurring - wrote in dissent.
7 See Anne Mactavish 'Tort Recovery for Economic Loss: Recent Developments'
(1993) 21 CBLJ 395. See also B.S. Markesinis 'Compensation for Negligently
Inflicted Pure Economic Loss' (1993) 109 Law QR 5.
8 See Comeau's Sea Foods Lfd. v. Canada (Minister of Fishaaes and Oceans (1992), 33
ACWS (3d) 889 (Fed. Ct TD); British Columbia Hydm and Pmuer Authutity v. N.D. Lea
& Associates Ltd. et al. (1992), 92 DLR (4th) 403, 33 ACWS (3d) 1304 (BCSC) ;
Madntosh & N m n (1981) U d . v. Cew Roperties Ltd. (1992), 36 ACWS (3d) 733
(BCCA); Can-Dive Services Ltd. v. PaciJic Coast Energy Gorp. (1993), 39 ACWS (3d) 385
(BCCA); London Drugs Ltd. v. Kuehne & Nagel International Ltd. et al. (1992). 97 DLR
(4th) 261,36ACWS (3d) 669 (SCC); Kn'pps et al. v. Touche Ross & Co. et aL (1992),
94 DLR (4th) 284,34 ACWS (3d) 758 (BCCA).
9 For a particularly thorough discussion of the entire area see Bruce Feldthusen
'Economic Loss in the Supreme Court of Canada: Yesterday and Tomorrow' (1991)
17 CBLJ 356. See also Joost Blom 'Economic Loss: Curbs on the Way Ahead?'
(1987) 12 CBLJ275; B. Feldthusen 'Economic Loss: Where Are We Going After
Junior Books?' (198687) 12 CBLJ241; David Cohen 'Bleeding Hearts and Pealing
Floors: Compensation for Economic Loss at the House of Lords uunior Books Ltd. v.
Va'tchi & Co., [I9821 3 All ER 2011' (1984) 18 UBCLR 289. See also, generally, B.
Feldthusen Economic Negiigence 2d ed. (Toronto: Carswell 1989).
10 I am indebted to Professor Joost Blom, who has written about this judgment in
some detail in 'Torts' in Annual Review of Lam and Practice (Vancouver: Continuing
Legal Education Society of British Columbia 1993) 480-3, for his excellent analysis
of the case.
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blanket exclusionary rule to recovery for pure economic loss in Canada." Furthermore, the Supreme Court held that there is no single rule
which will adequately address all the different activities that can result
in pure economic loss - typically, the social contexts in which economic
loss claims are generated involve the manufacture and design of malfunctioning products; the destruction of property which adversely affects the economic interests of third parties; the failure of governments
to fulfil regulatory mandates; and inaccurate information leading to
disappointed investor expectations. Finally, recovery for such loss,
notwithstanding the category, will not be based solely upon the reasonable foreseeability of the risk of damage. According to the Court, there
must be additional criteria or control devices to ensure that the 'floodgates' of potentially indeterminate liability are not flung wide.'' What is
immediately apparent is that there are few, if any, positive propositions
which one might state with certainty as comprising the law in Canada
with regard to recovery for pure economic loss.I3
I began this comment by noting that the focus of a law and economics analysis is not on the legal entitlements, welfare, obligations, or

11 All three judgments reject (at 303, 367, and 380) the decision of the House of
Lords in Murphy
. - v. Brentruood District Council [1991] 1 AC 398, which is seen as
denying recovery for pure economic loss in all cases other than those which fall
under the Hedlqr Byrne doctrine (Hedlqr, Byne 6' Co. Ltd. v. He& 6' Partners Lld
[I9641 AC 465, 119631 2All ER 575). The 'incremental approach' which the Court
adopted in Kumloops (City)v. Nieken [I9841 2 SCR 2, (1984) 10 DLR (4th) 641 is
seen as the appropriate Canadian position.
12 Thus, the liability for negligent misstatement in Hedlqr Byrne is based upon concepts
of 'reliance'; the liability for lost use of a chattel in Riutmu is based upon a duty to
warn of physical danger (RiutmuMarine Ltd. v. WashingtonIron W& (1984), 40 DLR
(3d) 530 (SCC)) and the liability found in Kumloops v. Nieken is based on the duty
of public officials to pursue their statutory obligations. T h e liability in Nursk was
based upon 'contractual relational economic loss,' a phrase which La Forest J
termed (at 291) 'convenient if somewhat barbarous.'
13 La Forest J notes (at 291-2), 'The courts below and my colleagues, Justices
McLachlin and Stevenson, are all of the view that CN's claim should be upheld. But
this unanimity is more apparent than real, for they do so for different reasons and,
indeed, there is significant disagreement on the determining issues.'
As Professor Blom points out, there is technically no ratio to the case, although if
McLachlin J's judgment is taken as the majority position, recovery for pure
economic loss will be available in situations where the plaintiffs connection with
the damaged property makes it virtually ajoint venturer with the owner. Blom goes
on to say, 'Beyond that extremely narrow category, Nursk settles nothing, except
that the courts will be open-minded about pure economic loss and will consider a
wide range of policy arguments in deciding whether a particular category of such
loss should be recoverable.' See supra note 10,483.
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responsibilities of the particular parties to an individual action. For that
reason, I will not focus further upon the decision in terms of its specific
economic effect upon Norsk Pacific or its shareholders, nor upon the
position of the federal government, nor on the rights or well-being of
Canadian National Railway. Rather my focus is on the impact of recognizing tort liability or denying claims in cases like Norsk, first, on the
activities of what might be referred to as transportationjim where those
activities may result in property damage; second, on the activities of
prop* owners who face the risk of damage to their property as a result
of the activities of transportation firms; and third, on the activities of
relational contractors who contract with property owners to use the
property which might be damaged, and which therefore face the risk of
economic losses (or the lost opportunity of economic gain) associated
with the interruption of their business activities.I4The important point
is that this categorization requires that my analysis look to the future
and the expected behaviour of firms other than the particular litigants
who came before the Court. It is, on that level, quite different from
doctrinal or principled legal analysis, which looks to rules or principles
developed in earlier decisions and the actual behaviour of the individuals engaged in the particular dispute.
The decision in Norsk is very likely to have significant effects upon
the manner in which analogous actors structure their future economic
activities and, for this reason, it is particularly well suited as the starting
point for economic analysis. The second element which makes this case
suitable for economic analysis is that it involves firms and property
owners and the effect of accidents on the wealth of those firms and
property owners. While property damage did occur, it was damage to
investment property. It was not damage to property to which individuals might have personal or psychological attachments. The case
apparently did not adversely affect the welfare or well-being of individuals, except insofar as the shareholders of the firms involved in the
litigation might have experienced an increase or reduction in the
expected income stream represented by their shares, due to the combined effect of the accident and the decision. It is fair, as well, to
assume that firms like Norsk and CN, and the federal government represented by Public Works Canada, are all interested in structuring
their interactions in a way which generates wealth for their shareholders or members. The link with economics is obvious. Finally, the judg-

14 The relationship between these groups is schematically diagrammed in Appendix
A.
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ments themselves are amenable to economic analysis. The nature of
the issues before the Court dictated that there be discussion of a
number of points which can be said to have the flavour of law and
economics.
I

Law and economics

Law and economics is concerned with efficiency - that is, with the
development or evaluation of legal decisions which result in the
production of goods and services in society at a lower marginal cost
than that associated with alternative decisions. Consequently, in this
analysis, I will not be concerned with the 'correctness' or 'rightness' of
the decision in terms of its consistency with precedent, notions of
desert, corrective justice, equal treatment, or any other normative basis
for decision-making. In evaluating the decision, I take the position that
one should examine the efficiency implications of the rule it contains.
Costs d o count in developing solutions to human problems.
Furthermore, law and economics recognizes that law is a social
institution and that, in using the law, the legal system is attempting to
respond in a rational manner to real, practical social problems. In that
light, legal decision-makers should think carefully before using abstract
legal concepts developed in one context to resolve issues in another. A
law and economics analysis rejects the assimilation of 'economic loss'
claims - which may arise in contexts as varied as product liability,
negligent information or advice, delayed delivery of documents by
couriers, and so on - and subsequent attempts to apply a single set of
principles to the varied claims.I5For example, there is, under current
doctrine, a considerable immunity for negligent misrepresentati~n.'~

15 La Forest J made this point when he stated (at 299): 'It does not follow ... that all
economic loss cases are susceptible to the same analysis, or that cases of one type
are necessarily relevant to cases of another. Nor does it follow that the constellation
of policy concerns that have grown up around the issue of economic loss can be
ignored. T h e fact is that different types of factual situations may invite different
approaches to economic loss, and it seem to me to be at best unwise to lump them
all together for purposes of analysis.'
16 Until quite recently, in the absence of a contractual or a fiduciary relationship,
there was , n o liability in tort for negligent misrepresentation. Although this
situation was changed by the decision of the House of Lords in Hedlqr Byrne - and
expanded in subsequent decisions in England and in Canada - the circumstances
under which one might bring a successful action for damages for pure economic
loss d u e to negligent statements remain quite circumscribed. As Earl Cherniak and
Kirk Stevens suggest in 'Two Steps Forward o r One Step Back? Anns at the
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This immunity may be justified by the fact that, in the absence of such
immunity, there would be an underproduction of information which
has some characteristics of a public good. The increased production of
information - predicated upon an immunity from tort liability - may
offset the lower than optimal production of information associated with
the inability of firms to capture all of the profits from the use of
information by others whom they cannot charge for the right to the
information. It should be obvious that that idea has little or no relevance to an analysis of the Norsk situation - in which we are attempting
to determine whether firms engaged in transporting goods and services
who damage property of other firms, should be liable for the economic
losses of still another set of firms who contracted with the property
owner for the use of the property.
Finally, I must apply one codicil to the analysis presented here. A law
and economics analysis of legal rules requires considerable information
about the activities of third parties, the availability and cost of insurance schemes, the costs to firms of managing and reducing liability
risks, the ability of firms to shift costs to others, and so on. This is quite
unlike the information required either for a doctrinal analysis of a legal
decision based on precedent at the appellate level, or for a judicial
determination of liability in negligence in .a particular case at trial. In
the former case, judges need information about prior decisions of
Canadian courts on the point of law under consideration; in the latter
case, judges need information about the standard of care reasonably
expected of defendants, about the contributory negligence on the part
of the plaintiff, and so forth. The information necessary to an analysis
of the expected behaviour of transportation firms, it appears to me, was
not available to the Court in Nmsk" Neither is it available to me.

Crossroads in Canada' (1992) 20 CBLJ 164 at 169, a major policy reason for such
restrictions is the 'potentially chilling effect on flows of commercial information
upon which a modern competitive economy depends.' For a thorough discussion
see B. Feldthusen Economic Negligence supra note 9. See also Allen M. Linden
Canudian Tort L a w 4th ed. (Toronto: Butterworths 1988).
17 This information gap is a product of judicial choice about institutional design,
reflecting the self-defined needs of many judges, and indeed of all trial judges, to
justify decisions based on independent legal rules, and on the behaviour of the
particular individualsbefore the court. My concern is that the Suprenie Court of
Canada is much more than a trial court. It is, of course, making decisions which
affect the legal rights of the parties to the litigation. However, it is, as well, making
decisions on which literally millions of others will base their behaviour in the
future. It is dificult to defend the operation of legal institutions which reject
information about, and analysis of, that expected future behaviour.
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The reduction of accident costs

One approach employed in law and economics in the context of accident compensation policy is to ask, simply, what system of legal rules,
administered by what institution, will reduce the (net) costs of accidents in society?" That question can itself be broken down still further
into three components. First, what set of legal rules will reduce the
number of accidents which will occur in a particular social context?
That is, which of the two legal rules debated in the Nwsk case - imposing liability on Norsk for CN's economic losses or immunizing Norsk
from that liability - will be more likely to reduce 'primary accident
costs'? Second, what system of legal rules will reduce the consequences
of those accidents which do occur in that context? That is, which of the
majority o r minority decisions will reduce 'secondary accident costs'?
Finally, what system of legal rules, and what institutional framework
within which those rules operate, will reduce the public and private
costs of administering the accident compensation process? That is,
which of the two legal outcomes will most effectively reduce 'tertiary
accident costs'? Both La Forest and McLachlin~touch upon aspects of
these questions in their judgments, although neither is as well organized or structured as one might hope."
REDUCING PRIMARY ACCIDENT COSTS

Transportation firms - airlines, shipping companies, trucking firms,
and so on - are engaged in activities which, for a variety of reasons, may
result in damage or losses to property owners and others. These accidents may occur for a number of reasons. Perhaps employees have not
been properly trained. Perhaps senior management has accepted too
many orders, forcing the firm to overuse equipment. Perhaps the inspection and maintenance operations of the firm have been systematically underfinanced due to demands by the marketing department for
more advertising resources. Perhaps the firm has neglected to invest in
weather-monitoring activities and thus ships goods in high risk situations. Perhaps the radar system purchased by the firm for its carriers is
inadequate. Perhaps the firm did not purchase radar for its carriers at
all. Whatever the reason, society is faced with a situation in which the

18 See Guido Calabresi The Gsfs ofAcn'dafs (New Haven: Yale University Press 1970).
19 See, for example, the judgment of La ForestJ at 345-53 entitled, 'Part IV: A refined
proximity analysis in contractual relational econon~icloss cases,' and see also the
judgment of McLachlin J at 372-4 entitled '(2) Economic Theory.'

Heinonline - - 45 U. Toronto L.J. 150 1995

activities of the transportation firm expose others (including property
owners and relational contractors) to risks which they would not otherwise have faced. Moreover, absent a social institution which shifts those
risks to the transportation firm, the costs generated by the accidents
which do occur are not included in the price of the service which the
transportation firm is selling.
This externalization of costs results in two undesirable consequences. In the first place, it reduces the incentive of the firm to engage
in accident-prevention measures as compared with the incentives which
the firm would have if it faced those risks and bore those costs. In the
second place, it results in lower prices for the transportation service, a
concomitantly higher demand for the service and, thus, more transportation activity - and, ultimately, more damage and loss to third parties
- than would be the case if the costs were borne by the. transportation
firm. Most law and economics theorists would argue, therefore, that
transportation firms should bear all of the costs of their transportation
activities. There should be no distinctions among the various ways in
which these losses manifest themselves - whether through personal
injury, property damage, or economic losses associated with property
damage. A social interest in reducing the number of accidents will be
furthered by legal rules which allocate these costs to the transportation
firm. Analysed in this way, all of the losses associated with the collision
between the Jervis Crown and the railway bridge '(and thus all of the
costs generated by transportation firms in general) should be allocated
to the defendant in this case. Viewed in this light, the Supreme Court
did not go far enough: there should be no restriction on recovery of
economic losses associated with transportation a~cidents.~'

20 This analysis should, however, require us to go further and determine whether
liability should be generated by the application of a simple causality test, o r
whether liability should be predicated on a determination of negligence. If the cost
internalization rationale is correct, there seems to be n o reason to limit the liability
of transportation firms to losses caused by their negligence. This appears to be a
powerful argument in favour of making transportation firms strictly liable for all of
the damage they 'cause.' While this may be true, it is not because it will result in a
greater reduction of primary costs. Rather, we should prefer strict liability because
it may result in lower secondary and tertiary costs. T h e standard of care which we
expect of firms can be analysed using precisely the same tripartite analysis employed in this comment. For example, concerns with minimizing tertiary accident costs
will lead to preferences for a strict liability rule. This will avoid public and private
litigation costs associated with determining negligence as compared with the costs
of determining causation. In a strict liability regime, firms still engage in costeffective accident reduction measures, but managers will determine when it is cost
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However, this primary accidentcost-avoidance rationale for cost
internalization to transportation firms, which would support the Norsk
outcome, and perhaps more, must be qualified by a number of important points which support the dissenting position expressed by La
Forest J, or at least significantly weaken the cost internalization argument that might otherwise justify and support McLachlin J'S majority
position. First, one could argue that the property owner 'caused the
accident,' and that it is property owners who should internalize the
costs of damage and losses to transportation firms when their bridges
get in the way of tugboats." That is, the cost-internalization argument
can be reversed, and one can argue for the allocation of accident costs
to bridgeawning firms, to ensure that they engage in accident-prevention measures. Although this is an attractive argument, the question is
better phrased in the following manner - in general, as between
transportation firms and property owners, which of these can most
effectively prevent collisions from occurring at the lower marginal
cost?= It may be that the installation of protective barriers in front of

effective to reduce accidents and when the costs of accident-reduction measures
exceed the reduction in liability for accidents which are avoided. Managers are
simply better at doing that than are judges. More important, ifjudges are systematically wrong there is no way to correct them. If managers are systematically wrong,
the firm will generate less profit than competitive firms and the managers will
either modify their decisions or, one hopes, be replaced. Where the market will
discipline managers, it will not cannot - discipline judges.
21 This is one of the more important insights Ronald Coase developed in 'The Problem of Social Cost' (1960) 3J. of Laru &Econ. 1. The welfare losses represented by
tugboat accidents are produced as a result of the interaction of two or more activities - in this case, bridge owning and tugboat operating. It is only because both
activities occur in temporal and geographical proximity that accidents occur.
22 It should he noted that asking which of transportation firms or bridge owners can
either 'prevent or reduce the probability and/or consequences of the risk occurring at the lower marginal cost' may be an oversimplification of the analysis and
may result in inaccurate risk allocation and contractual design. The preferred
approach should be to ask 'who can maximize the expected return on their
investment in accident reduction measures.' Simply to ask who can reduce the
probability and/or consequences of the risk occurring at the lower marginal cost
may, notwithstanding its apparent simplicity, produce an inefficient presumptive
rule. The following examples illustrate the point.
Assume that the expected cost of a particular risk (that is, the expected accident
costs, eac) is $100. A can, by investing $40, reduce the eac to $70. B, by expending
$15, can reduce the eac to $80. Clearly it is in the interests of both parties to
allocate responsibility for this risk to B.
Assume again that the eac is $100 but in this case A, by expending $6, can reduce
the eac to $30 while B, by expending $3, can reduce the eac to $40. Clearly, while

-
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bridges could cost-effectively minimize collisions between tugboats,
barges, and bridges. Perhaps bridge owners could install beacons which
would be transmitted on a medium which tugboat operators use in any
event, thus warning operators when they approach bridges. If bridge
owners can prevent accidents from occurring, or otherwise reduce the
number of accidents which d o occur, at a lower marginal cost than the
transportation firm, then it is clear that we should be internalizing costs
to the bridge owner and not to the transportation firm. As I noted
earlier, information as to the identity of the party who can manage
collision risks most effectively is not generated in most legal proceedings. However, it would seem, intuitively, that tugboat operators are, in
general, better equipped to manage those risks. More important, it
would seem incontrovertible that, as between tugboat operators and
firms contracting to use bridges - such as .CN - the former group is
much more likely to be able to reduce the risks of accidents occurring,
at a lower marginal cost than the latter. Thus while the necessary
information to access this issue is not available, the cost internalization
argument, even with this more complicated analysis, would appear to
support the majority decision in Norsk.
Second, it may be that the legal system, insofar as it is driven by
allocative efficiency norms, should not develop legal rules which treat
all losses as equivalent. Legal rules which are sensitive to efficiency
norms should, perhaps, distinguish between adverse effects on third
parties (that is, negative externalities) which are 'technological' from
those which are 'pecuniary.' Technological externalities consist of costs
or losses - personal injuries or property damage - in which the productive capacity of society's human capital or industrial base is reduced
temporarily or permanently. In such cases, legal rules should impose
those costs on the firm which is the most efficient accident avoider.
Pecuniary externalities, by contrast, consist of costs or losses - usually
contract entitlements or lost opportunities - in which there is n o
reduction in our social capital, but merely a transfer of wealth from one
firm to another. For example, the business losses of both pwc and CN

the eac is lower if we allocate the risk to A, it is better to allocate the risk to B. An
investment of $3 to obtain a return of $60 is better than an investment of $G to
obtain a return of $70.
This is all to say that a prescription stating that we should develop common law
rules which allocate risks so as to 'minimize expected accident costs' is somewhat of
an oversimplification. Rather, the objective of the legal system in shaping common
law rules should be to maximize the expected rate of return on investments in
accident prevention measures.
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due to CN's temporary inability to use the bridge were very likely
someone else's gain. While pecuniary externalities are a subset of social
costs, they are distributive rather than allocative, and thus categorically
different from property damage or personal injury. The distinction between pecuniary and technological externalities supports La Forest J's
dissenting judgment which would insulate tugboat and other transportation firms from the former subset of externalities.
The third qualification on a simple cost-internalization argument
which otherwise might support the majority judgment is produced
through an analysis of the most efficient way to force internalization by
transportation firms. For example, the legal rules may, as was done in
the Norsk decision, give to numerous relational contractors the right to
sue in tort against transportation firms to recover lost profits and other
economic losses. Cost internalization in that situation will be produced
through a combination of cost-efficient accident reduction measures by
transportation firms, and tort litigation by relational contractors.
Conversely, the legal rules might, as La Forest J argued, deny relational
contractors the right to recover economic losses from transportation
firms. This legal rule would create incentives for relational contractors
to include a term in their contracts with property owners which stipulate that property owners will bear the losses suffered by relational
contractors in the event of damage to the property.23Some property
owners will then, perhaps, be able to recover that loss as a consequential loss in a tort action against the transportation company. The losses
of what might be substantial numbers of relational contractors will,
where it is cost effective to do so, be 'channeled' through the property
owner to the transportation firm.24While each of these methods is
equally viable in theory as an instrument which will reduce primary
costs and internalize externalities, the latter channeling structure will
be preferable if it will increase the extent of cost internalization which
takes place. This structure will reduce secondary and tertiary costs and,
thus, will more likely result in cost internalization and accident-avoidance measures where justified. Once one investigates the cost-internalization issue more closely, La Forest J'S judgment would appear to
be favoured on efficiency grounds.

23 This term will be included only where, as between a contracting party and the
property owner, the property owner is in a better position to manage collision risks
and the ensuing consequences to contracting parties. As I point out later, in many
cases that will not be so.
24 See William Bishop 'Economic Loss in Tort' (1982) 2 OxfmdJ. of Legal Studies, 1, 2.
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As well, La Forest J'S analysis is supported when one takes into
account the increased costs of insurance which will be generated by
allocating risk of property damage and economic losses to transportation firms. It is generally assumed that first-party insurance - insurance
purchased by firms to cover their direct losses if an accident occurs - is
generally less expensive than third-party liability insurance - insurance
purchased by firms which might be sued by other firms who experience
losses. That is, insurance firms would charge transportation firms more
for protection against lawsuits brought by property owners than the
same insurance firms would charge property owners for protection
against damage to their property caused by the same accident. This is
so simply because the insurance firms are likely to know more about
the risks they are assuming when they insure a particular piece of
property than they know about risks when they insure the transportation company against damage to as yet undetermined property owned
by as yet unidentified property owners. Assuming that it is less costly for
property owners to obtain insurance protecting them from the losses
associated with damage from accidents caused by transportation firms,
we ought to prefer a world where the transportation firm is not liable
for damage to property owners.25
A final qualification on the cost-internalization rationale for the
majority position is presented through an assessment of the implications of accident and business loss insurance on primary cost-avoidance
measures. There is some intimation in the decision that the majority
dismisses the cost-internalization argument by assuming that the existence of insurance will attenuate primary accident avoidance mea~ures.'~
That is true, but only to a very limited degree. Insurance companies
can be expected to include terms in their insurance contracts with
transportation firms as well as with property owners and relational
contractors, which consensually regulate the behaviour of insured firms
so as to control and reduce the exposure of the insurance firm to
claims. For example, insurers of transportation firms may require
certification of vessels, conlpliance with regulations, proper training of
personnel, exclusions of some kinds of claims, deductibles, and so

25 The same argument is developed below in connection with insurance and the
allocation of risks of economic losses to transportation firms.
26 Specifically, McLachlin J (at 372-3) implies that, first, to eliminate recovery for
economic loss would significantly reduce the incentives of transportation firms to
take care; and, second, that insurance, and in particular insurance for loss profits,
would be unavailable at a reasonable cost. La Forest J, by contrast, (at 349-50).
rejects both of these premises.

Heinonline - - 45 U. Toronto L.J. 155 1995

forth. Furthermore, insurance firms will 'risk-rate' insureds into
categories, thus penalizing individual firms which have the characteristics of firms which present higher or more numerous claims, or which
have a personal history of higher or more numerous claims. If insurance firms do this well," the incidence of accidents will not increase
substantially as a result of insurance coverage. The 'contractual regulation' by insurance firms, in effect, replaces the deterrent effects of tort
liability with the deterrent effects of welldesigned insurance policies.
What this might mean is that the legal system should develop rules
which allocate accident risks to the party whose insurance company is
best able to monitor and control primary costs - that is, to the transportation firm. However, as I point out below," the issue is complicated
when one considers a more nuanced assessment of the insurance question, which takes into account insurance for secondary costs. However,
this analysis does suggest that a societal interest in reducing primary
accident costs would appear to support the majority judgment in Norsk.
In the end, an analysis of the impact of legal rules on primary
accident costs suggests that while the majority judgment in Norsk is
defensible, there are a number of important qualifications on a simplistic cost-internalization argument which might otherwise justify imposing liability on transportation firms. These qualifications operate more
strongly in the context of an analysis of the allocation of risks of
economic losses experienced by relational contractors, and, taken
together, offer considerable support for the minority position articulated by La Forest J. This support is strengthened when one extends the
analysis of legal rules to take into account their impact on secondary
and tertiary costs.
REDUCING SECONDARY COSTS

Once we have designed a liability rule which will optimally reduce the
number of accidents which occur, we must then reconsider the design
of that rule in the light of a societal interest in reducing the consequences
of those accidents which cannot be eliminated in a cost-effective
manner. One significant way to reduce the consequences of accidents is
through 'loss-spreading.' The consequences of accidents are reduced that is, welfare losses experienced by firms and individuals are lessened
- when many individuals and firms bear a relatively small loss, as

27 And there is, it might he argued, a sufficient degree of competition within the
insurance industry to expect this to be the case.

28 See under the heading Reducing Tertiary Costs, infra.
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compared with the situation where one or two individuals or firms face
highly focused, catastrophic losses. The question then becomes, what
set of legal rules will result in the greatest amount of loss-spreading?
First, we might look at the structure of transportation firms, property
owning firms and relational contracting firms, and their associated
relationships among one another, to determine the implications of
shifting losses from one to the other through tort law, as compared
with the implications of leaving losses where they fall. At this point the
question becomes, as between transportation firms, property owners,
and relational contractors, who is the most efficient insurer against the
consequences of accidents? Prior to examining some answers to that
question, we should note that lossspreading can take place through the
purchase of insurance from independent or captive insurance companies or through self-insurance as firms factor expected losses into
production decisions and reallocate them through price, dividend, and
wage adjustments.
In my analysis of primary accident costs, I suggested that it is generally assumed that first-party insurance - insurance purchased by firms
to cover their direct losses if an accident occurs - is generally less
expensive than third-party liability insurance - insurance purchased by
firms which might be sued by other firms who experience losses. This
led to a conclusion that the cost-internalization benefits of making
transportation firms liable for property damage and economic losses
would be offset, to some degree, by the increased insurance costs and
the reduction in insurance coverage associated with that rule. Assuming that it is less costly for property owners to obtain insurance protecting them from the losses associated with damage from accidents caused
by transportation firms, we ought to prefer a world where the transportation firm is not liable for damage to property owners.
Similarly, one predicts that insurance firms will generally charge
both transportation firms and property owners more for third-party
liability insurance protection against lawsuits brought by relational
contractors for recovery of economic losses than the same insurance
firms would charge those contractors .directly for first-party insurance
against business losses which the contractors experience. This is so
simply because the insurance firms know more about the risks faced by
the firms for which they provide first-party insurance than they d o
about the unknowable claims which third-party liability insurance must
apply to. Insurance firms know more about the business risks faced by
relational contractors - the first-party insurance case - than about the
risks they would be assuming on behalf of transportation companies
faced with economic loss claims. This suggests that the dissenting
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position of La Forest J is preferable, and that transportation firms
should not be held liable when others can purchase insurance at a
much lower cost for the same anticipated incident. La Forest J's
decision would place responsibility for obtaining first-party liability
insurance against business losses on relational contractors. This would
appear to be an efficient outcome, at least as compared with the
outcome produced by McLachlin J'S judgment, which places responsibility on transportation firms to obtain third-party liability insurance
against at least some business losses experienced by relational contractors. If La Forest ~'sjudgmentwere to prevail, not only would relational
contractors obtain insurance for their business losses at a lower marginal cost than could transportation firms and insurance companies for
the same coverage, but insurance firms could ensure that relational
contractors reduce their loss exposure through the development of alternative transportation measures, or through risk allocation arrangements in their subcontracts, which would be available in emergency
situations. Whatever the option chosen, economic incentives to allocate
the risk of transportation accidents through contractual negotiation are
substantially reduced if, as McLachlinJ would have it, at least some relational contractors are given a claim in tort against transportation firms.
Finally, an analysis of the way in which legal rules affect secondary
costs suggests that transportation firms should not be liable for business
losses experienced by relational contractors, because this immunity will
increase the incentive for relational contractors to negotiate with
property owners for protection against those losses. This, in turn,
ensures that, as between property owners and relational contractors,
the cost of the accident will be allocated to the party who can manage
the risk of accidents in the most cost-effective manner. Where that
contractual risk-shifting does not occur, relational contractors, knowing
they cannot recover in tort against transportation firms and knowing
that they cannot recover against the property owners in contract, can
mitigate the consequences of accidents in other ways. Perhaps relational contractors can purchase options to use alternative modes of transportation at a cost which is less than property owners' costs of ensuring
access to the . bridge. Perhaps relational contractors can negotiate
subcontracts with consignors so as to relieve relational contractors of
liability for delays in delivery due to bridge closures. All of this suggests,
confirming the efficiency rationale for La Forest~'sjudgment, that the
consequences of transportation accidents could be significantly reduced if the risk of those consequences were placed on relational
contractors, such as CN,and not on transportation firms.
This efficient allocation of the risk of bridge closures will occur so
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long as contractual freedom exists - that is, in the absence of governmental regulation of the terms of the relevant contracts - and so long
as there are no systematic informational errors which lead parties to
make inefficient decisions. McLachlin J is simply wrong when she saysm
that inequality of bargaining power results in attenuation of efficient
contractual risk allocation. First, there is no reason to assume, in
general, and as between property owners and relational contractors,
that one party could systematically exploit informational errors and
thus negotiate inefficient risk allocation arrangements. Mere inequality
of market power may affect the distribution of the gains associated with
efficient risk allocation, but will not affect the allocative arrangements
themselves.
REDUCING TERTIARY COSTS

The final stage in an analysis of the efficiency implications of legal
doctrine is to attempt to reduce the administrative costs of the accident
compensation system through which the legal rule will be implemented. For example, a legal rule such as that articulated in the dissent
in Nmsk, which establishes clear legal entitlements - so-called 'bright
lines' between liability and no-liability states - are generally preferable
to more nuanced standards. First, they provide clear signals to parties
as to who must take steps to prevent accidents and obtain insurance
and, thus, reduce duplication and waste. Second, bright lines reduce
uncertainty, which, to most firms and individuals, represents an additional cost of engaging in business or other activities. Finally, bright
lines reduce the public and private administrative costs of determining
whether a particular plaintiff falls within the class of persons who have
legal entitlements. With that in mind, it is eminently sensible to limit
actions against transportation companies exclusively to property owners
- and to exclude relational contractors - and thus provide a clear line
demarcating who can sue and who cannot. There are significant costs
associated with the majority decision in Norsk which would permit nonproperty owners to argue that they are effectively 'owners of property'
due to some informal, implicit joint venture or partnership relationship, or because they are the primary users of the property, or because
they own property around the property in question or are, in some
sense, believed to be the owners of the pr~perty.~"
Clearly, none of

29 At 374.
30 McLachlin J, accepting the reasoning of the trial judge, held that CN could be
characterized as a tjoint' or 'common venturer' with PWC and thereby be entitled to
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these situations, or any others like them, serve to make them property
owners identifiable through a clearly delineated legal rule, and concerns with tertiary costs suggests that they should not be treated as
such.
The reduction of administrative costs also implies that legal rules
should be developed which tend to deny liability since, by doing so,
society avoids both private litigation costs as well as the public subsidization of private legal action. Rules which allow recovery of economic
losses by relational contractors substantially increase litigation costs
beyond what they would have been if only property owners were permitted to litigate rights arising from transportation incidents. Furthermore, this rule again provides incentives to relational contractors to
assess the risk of business interruption and negotiate the allocation of
that risk during negotiation of the contract to use the property. These
negotiation costs are private, not public and, more importantly, are
likely to be substantially less than the costs of litigation even when
taken in the aggregate. That is, secondary as well as tertiary cost avoidance considerations suggest the advantage of channeling structures.
Finally, a societal interest in reducing tertiary costs implies the
development of legal rules which lead to single insurers over multiple
insurers. Where a no-liability rule forces relational contractors to insure
against business losses, one might expect substantial administrative
costs associated with the negotiation of large numbers of these firstparty insurance policies. One alternative is to impose liability on
transportation firms, who then take out one policy (a third-party
liability policy) which provides coverage against claims from large
numbers of relational contractors. Where the cost of the insurance
exceeds the benefits to the particular transportation firm, a liability
rule imposing risks of relational contractor business losses on transportation firms may result in avoidance of the transaction costs of insurance entirely. Avoiding these transaction costs would be associated
with their replacement by litigation and settlement costs where transportation accidents occur. This advantage, though, might be more

recover for its economic loss. She stated (at 376), 'The reasoning, as I apprehend it, is
that where the plaintiffs operations are so closely allied to the operations of the party
suffering physical damage and to its property (which - as damaged -causes the plaintiff s loss) that it can be considered ajoint venturer with the owner of the property,
the plaintiff can recover its economic loss even though the plaintiff has suffered n o
physical damage to its own property. T o deny recovery in such circumstances would
be to deny it to a person who for practical purposes is in the same position as if he o r
she owned the property physically damaged.' See also supra, note 2.
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apparent than real. Relational contractors, even under a rule which
does not preclude their suing transportation firms, may insure in any
event in order to avoid litigation costs and, by so doing, buy into a strict
liability regime which will avoid or reduce delays in obtaining compensation.
Conclusion
This comment has been predicated upon one definition of efficiency
and one model of law and economics analysis in arriving at the outcomes presented. Other definitions and models - Coasian, cost-benefit
analysis - may well produce other answers, other ways of viewing the
problem, or other sets of criteria upon which to make future decisions
as to the best distribution of costs and liability risks. Ultimately, knowing whether a particular legal rule is efficient relative to the alternatives
must depend on the acquisition of substantial amounts of information
about the behaviour of large numbers of firms and individuals in the
future and not on the facts which arise from litigation and the courts.
The inadequacy of the current legal institutions to generate the information necessary to arrive at defensible prescriptions on the efficacy
of particular legal rules provides another basis for supporting the
dissent of La Forest J over the outcome under the majority judgment.
The major insight generated by the Coase theorem3' is that if parties
are free to bargain costlessly, the ultimate allocation of legal liability
(or, put another way, the ultimate allocation of a legal entitlement) is
independent of the initial determination of liability (or the initial
allocation of the legal entitlement) by the legal system. It may be that
transportation firms are not, in general, the superior risk-bearers in
relation to economic loss suffered by relational contractors. In that
case, and in the light of the transaction costs involved, the majority
decision of the Supreme Court holding transportation firms responsible for the losses of relational contractors cannot be corrected
through bilateral or multilateral contractual negotiation through which
the risks could be reallocated to the superior insurer or risk-bearer.32
Conversely, the legal rule produced by La Forest J'S dissenting judgment, which allocates the risk of loss to relational contractors, can, at a
relatively low cost, be trumped by contractual risk allocations between

31 R. Coase 'The Problem of Social Cost' (1960) 3 J. of Larv €3 Econ. 1.
32 A specious caveat to that assertion would be the possibility of transportation firms
identifying major relational contractors ex ante, and negotiating with then1 to shift
the risk of economic losses to the relational contractor where it is efficient to do so.
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the relational contractors and the property owner in circumstances
where the property owner is the superior risk-bearer. In this situation,
the relational loss can be reallocated to the transportation firm through
the recovery of consequential damages by the property owner against
the transportation
Again, if one considers the consequences of a
misallocation of risk by the legal system, the dissenting judgment of La
Forest J would appear to be preferable insofar as it permits the legal
system and contractual negotiation between the parties to remedy the
legal error.34
Economic analysis of law suggests that, if efficiency is a dominant
norm which should shape social ordering in this context, La Forest J'S
dissent should be adopted as the governing legal rule. Furthermore,
economic analysis of law suggests that even if La ForestJ's dissent is not
efficient, it is more likely than what seems to be the inefficient decision
of the majority to be corrected over time through contractual negotiation and tort law.

33 This conteniplates a situation where the contract between the property owner and
the relational contractor imposes liability upon the property owner for any unplanned closures of the bridge. The economic losses suffered by the property owner
niight then be characterized as positive outlays (due and owing under contract) and
not simply as lost profits (where remoteness rules may preclude recovery). Support
for the recovery of economic losses in the form of positive outlays can be found in the
case of Dominimz Tape of Canada O d . v. L.R. Md)onald &Sons ZA., [I9711 3 OR 627.
The plaintiff, the owner ofa manufacturing plant, sued for the recovery oflost profits
and wages when the negligently loaded trailer of the defendant knocked over apower
pole, causing a power failure. The Court ruled that while the loss of profit was
foreseeable, itwas too remote. However, the wages were recoverable in that they were
a 'proximate and direct consequence of the wrongful act of the defendants and not
too remote to be recovered.' Such losses can be contrasted with 'negative' losses
consisting of a 'mere deprivation of an opportunity to earn an income.' As Linden
notes (supra note 15,385): '011 the basis of this approach, which is not too dissimilar
to the property damage cases, economic losses that take the form of actual expenses
incurred, as contrasted to potential profits that are not earned, may yield liability.'
It should be obvious that if the Court is willing to allow recovery by CN for relational
losses of the kind under discussion -that is, pure economic loss- there is little, if any,
difference. in allowing recovery of such provable consequential economic losses
suffered by the property owner. The foreseeabilityand remotenessconsiderations are
clearly identical, if not stronger in the latter case.
34 This reallocation will not occur, however, where the relational contractor is, as
between it and the property owner, the superior risk bearer; and where, simultaneously, the transportation firm is the superior risk bearer as between it and the
property owner; and where the transportation firm is, as between it and the
relational contractor, the superior risk bearer.
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